Can Contractualism and Consequentialism be used together in a two-stage model? by O’Connor, Daisy
Res Cogitans
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 8
2019
Can Contractualism and Consequentialism be
used together in a two-stage model?
Daisy O’Connor
University of Reading, daisy.oconnor26@gmail.com
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CommonKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Res Cogitans by an authorized
editor of CommonKnowledge. For more information, please contact CommonKnowledge@pacificu.edu.
Recommended Citation
O’Connor, Daisy (2019) "Can Contractualism and Consequentialism be used together in a two-stage model?," Res Cogitans: Vol. 10:
Iss. 1, Article 8. https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1189
© 2019 O’Connor. This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
ISSN 2155-4838 | Res Cogitans is published by the Pacific University Libraries
Can Contractualism and 
Consequentialism be used together 
in a two-stage model?
Volume 10, Issue 1 (2019)
Res Cogitans
Daisy O’Connor
University of Reading
daisy.oconnor26@gmail.com
https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1189
Abstract
Contractualism and consequentialism, two of the most prominent theories in contemporary morality, 
are often perceived to be in opposition to each other. This essay will propose a novel two-stage system 
for moral decision-making which combines the two. I will explain how this model retains the strengths 
of contractualism and consequentialism, whilst resolving many of the problems with the theories as 
they stand alone. 
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Introduction
In this essay I will propose a novel two-stage model for moral decision-making. First, 
contractualism is used to rule out any acts which are forbidden. Then, if this leaves 
more than one act available, scalar consequentialism is used to order the remaining 
acts in a continuous scale of deontic status. I will first set out some important defi-
nitions. I will then explain the two-stage model and the deontic role of each stage 
in more detail. I will then demonstrate the two-stage model with an example moral 
dilemma. Finally, I will explain and respond to the two strongest arguments in opposi-
tion to my model: the argument that Parfit’s hybrid model is sufficient, and the argu-
ment from demandingness. 
Definitions
Deontology
Deontology refers to the deontic status (the “rightness” or “wrongness”) of acts. There 
are many deontological categories, including but not limited to “permissible”, “re-
quired”, and “forbidden.” See Harman (2016), for example, for a discussion on further 
categories. 
Contractualism
“Contractualism… holds that an act is wrong if its performance under the circum-
stances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of be-
haviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement” (Scanlon 1998, 153) For the purposes of this essay, “rule” and “principle” 
are synonymous.
 
Consequentialism
Consequentialists argue that the “goodness” of an act’s consequences (i.e. the act’s 
axiological value) is what determines the “rightness” of the act (its deontology, as 
above). Specifically, my two-stage model uses scalar act-consequentialism, a pre-ex-
isting definition of which is hard to find. Hooker (2008, 1) writes “Act-consequentialism 
is normally characterised as the view that the rightness or wrongness of any act is a 
matter of a comparison of that act’s consequences with the consequences of alterna-
tive acts,” although Hooker himself is a rule-consequentialist. Scalar consequential-
ists argue that “rightness and wrongness isn’t an all-or-nothing issue” (Norcross 2016, 
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220), although Norcross is a scalar utilitarian. Bringing these two theories together, 
scalar act-consequentialism can be understood as:
The comparison of an act’s consequences with the consequences of 
alternative acts determines the relative “rightness” of the available acts.
Clarifications to these definition and justifications for choosing these very specific 
forms of contractualism and consequentialism will be discussed in the following sec-
tion. 
1. Contractualism
     a. What principles are unrejectable?
     b. In this situation, which act(s) conflict with these principles?
2. Scalar act consequentialism
The two-stage model
I will now explain the two-stage model and the deontological role of each stage. 
1) Contractualism
The process in step 1a) is the same as in Scanlon’s principle contractualism, with one 
clarification. Scanlon writes that the difference between “reasonable” and “rational” 
rejection is “not a technical one, but a familiar distinction in ordinary language,” but 
I argue that the distinction is more than linguistic and is vital in understanding the 
strongest version of contractualism. Scanlon’s own example demonstrates the differ-
ence (1998, 192-194). It would be reasonable for you to request more water from your 
irritable landowner, but not rational, as he will likely be angered and reduce your sup-
ply further. Contractualism based on rational rejection of principles would place too 
heavy a weight on circumstantial technicalities such as a landowner’s temperament, 
which should not be a consideration in determining the rightness of your action.
Step 1b) is to determine which of the available acts conflict with the unrejectable prin-
ciples determined above and are thus forbidden.
Thus far we have not strayed from Scanlon’s contractualism, so it is now important to 
explain why his theory is not sufficient alone as a moral theory. In most moral dilem-
mas, the agent is left with several non-forbidden options after implementing steps 1a) 
and 1b). There are three views on this problem. 
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Firstly, Scanlon argues that the contractualist does not end up with several options. 
Contractualism’s comparative nature means we weigh up the reasonable “objections 
to permission” versus the reasonable “objections to prohibition” (1998, 195). Cru-
cially, however, these objections are to principles, not acts. So, indeed, Scanlonian 
contractualism does not result in multiple conflicting principles. But nevertheless, 
several different acts can cohere with these principles. 
The second view is Sheinman’s, who writes “presumably, when we declare an act 
rejectable relative to an alternative, we are also declaring the alternative unreject-
able” (1998, 306). Sheinman argues here that principle contractualism never results 
in multiple options, because to reject one principle is to automatically accept the 
other. However, his presumption is only correct when the number of rejectable acts is 
exactly one less than the number of available acts (and non-action is also rejectable/
impermissible). For example, if there are three available acts, to declare two of the 
acts rejectable is to declare the third act unrejectable. But if there are five available 
acts, to declare two of them unrejectable is to say nothing of the other three.
I argue for a third view: contractualism does often leave the agent with several avail-
able, non-forbidden acts but this is not necessarily problematic. This is exactly why 
the two-stage model is required. To attempt to use Scanlonian contractualism to jus-
tify only one act in a moral situation is misconceived and is to weaken an otherwise 
very sound moral theory. 
I will now explain the deontological role (and limits) of contractualism in more detail. 
As discussed, the strongest version of principle contractualism only determines which 
acts are forbidden (as it is framed in Scanlon’s definition). Sheinman (2001, 292-293) 
defines contractualism by framing it around two other deontological statuses:
A has an obligation to do X (and A’s failure to do X is wrong) just when 
principles no one could reasonably reject as public standards of behaviour 
(unrejectable principles) require A to do X.
Additionally/alternatively:
A’s doing X is right (permissible) just when A’s doing X conforms to 
unrejectable principles. 
Sheinman presumes that principle contractualism “includes both prongs.” This 
sweeping presumption is made with little consideration for the effect this would 
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have on the role of the theory. Being obligated to do act X means the agent has a 
duty to do X. Failure to do X would constitute a moral wrong. Being permitted to do 
X, however, means the agent is allowed to do X, but failure to do X does not consti-
tute a moral wrong. More importantly, neither of Sheinman’s definitions are accurate 
of Scanlonian contractualism. It may appear that Sheinman’s second definition (re: 
permissible) is simply another way of wording Scanlon’s definition (re: forbidden). 
However, as explained above, if the contractualist determines that one act is forbid-
den (or rejectable), they have not necessarily determined that any alternative acts 
are permissible (or unrejectable). 
Scanlon’s conception of “what we owe to each other” does have some constraints 
(see 1998, 180-187), such as not being directly applicable to nature. But as I have ar-
gued, the strongest version of contractualism is even more minimal: it is used in my 
model only to determine which acts are forbidden according to “what we owe to each 
other”. Scanlon does briefly suggest a hybrid system of contractualism and another 
theory, to resolve the conflicts between contractualism and intuition: he suggests 
that once “what we owe to each other” is established, another moral value could be 
used to make decisions (1998, 231). This is exactly what I am arguing for in this essay. 
Scanlon writes that such a system’s “hybrid character is unsatisfying,” but does not 
elaborate. Scanlon does explain (1998, 246) that his moral theory does not specify 
named moral values (e.g. welfare or good consequences) because the purpose of 
moral theory is not to remove moral judgement entirely. However, as will be dem-
onstrated in the Example section, the use of scalar consequentialism ensures that 
judgement is very much still needed in the two-stage model. 
If the process so far leaves only one available act remaining, then the moral decision-
making process stops here. IF, however, there are several acts remaining after steps 
1a) and 1b), the agent moves on to step two. 
2) Consequentialism 
Consequentialism is only used if contractualism is inconclusive. As we are using sca-
lar act consequentialism, the remaining acts (those which have not been forbidden 
by contractualism) are ordered according the relative optimificity of their conse-
quences.
I will now justify the use of scalar consequentialism. The decision-making agent would 
be misled to attempt to use consequentialism to sort acts into discrete categories of 
“permissible”, “obligatory” etc. It makes sense to use contractualism to put acts into 
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(exactly) two discrete categories, “forbidden” or “not forbidden”, because the ques-
tion “Does the act conflict with unrejectable principles?” has (exactly) two answers: 
yes or no. However, it is nonsensical to use consequentialism to put acts into discrete 
categories because “How good are the act’s consequences?” is not a yes/no question. 
It is impossible to effectively use a continuous axiological value (goodness) to place 
acts into discrete deontological categories (Norcross 2016). Thus, scalar consequen-
tialism is the stronger version of consequentialism. 
Act-consequentialism is used rather than rule-consequentialism because using rule-
consequentialism would mean the two-stage model would be as follows:
1) Contractualism
     a) What principles are unrejectable?
     b) In this situation, which act(s) conflict with those principles? 
2) Consequentialism
     a) Which principles generally have the best consequences?
     b) In this situation, which acts conform/conflict with those principles?
A model using two separate sets of rules would be confusing and convoluted. 
The problems which usually apply to act-consequentialism do not apply in the two-
stage model. For example, Hooker argues that act-consequentialism (but not rule-
consequentialism) often leads to acts which contradict our intuitive moral judge-
ments (2008, 4-5). For example, suppose that Fabio physically harms Antonio to 
obtain a benefit to himself which is very slightly larger than the harm done to Anto-
nio. Rule-consequentialism would hold that this act is wrong, because it conflicts 
with a rule (“do not physically harm people”), the acceptance of which generally has 
better consequences than its non-acceptance. Act-consequentialism would hold that 
Fabio’s action was right because it had better consequences than not performing the 
act. I agree with Hooker that rule-consequentialism coheres better with our intuition 
than act-consequentialism does in examples such as these (which are indeed com-
mon). I also agree that cohering with our intuition is an important marker to consid-
er. However, this is not problematic for my model. Such unintuitive acts would have 
been ruled out by contractualism in stage 1b). Fabio’s harming of Antonio would con-
flict with the unrejectable principle “do not physically harm people”, so would not 
have made it past stage 1. In the two-stage model, act-contractualism is only applied 
to acts which Scanlonian contractualism does not forbid.
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Example
I will now use the moral dilemma of eating meat to demonstrate how the two-stage 
model is used. Note that another agent could disagree with me on the decisions 
made at each stage, but the specifics of this exact dilemma are unimportant here.
1)Contractualism 
 
1a) Which principles are reasonably unrejectable? The relevant unrejectable prin    
ciple here is “Do not harm living beings”. 
1b) In this situation, which act(s) conflict with these principles? Clearly, killing/   
hunting an animal oneself conflicts with the above principle, and is thus forbidden. 
This is all we can clearly say using contractualism.
At this point we have several acts still available, so we proceed:
 
2) Consequentialism. 
The remaining acts are considered and ordered according the optimificity of their 
consequences, resulting in a scale which can be conceived as follows:
Most optimific consequences 
• Never eating meat or animal products
• Never eating meat, eating animal products
• Occasionally eating meat
• Regularly eating meat
Least optimific consequences 
The agent then judges which of these acts to implement. Moral theory cannot re-
move the need for situation-based judgement (and it is mistaken for moral theo-
rists to think that it can). The two-stage model is used to inform the agent of the 
“rightness” of the available acts, relative to each other, so that the agent can decide 
which act to do. 
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Objections and responses
Objection One: Parfit
Derek Parfit, in On What Matters: Vol. III (2011) proposes a different hybrid model of 
contractualism and consequentialism. His Triple Theory combines Scanlonian con-
tractualism, Kantian contractualism, and Rule-Consequentialism. A proponent of 
Triple Theory might ask three questions, which I will answer in turn.
Why not include Kantian contractualism? 
Kantian contractualism is based on rationality which, as I argued in the section Two- 
Stage Model, is an inferior basis of morality to reasonableness.
Why not consider the theories side-by-side? What is the need for a hierarchy? 
The problem with Parfit’s model is its contradictions. There are many cases in which 
consequentialism and contractualism differ in their outcomes, which Parfit does 
acknowledge throughout chapter 81. The hierarchical system solves precisely that 
problem. There are two types of contradiction:
Type one: Contractualism forbids the act, but it has good consequences.
This is quite common. For example, the “killing/hunting animals” option 
above would fall into this category if the agent is a hunter who makes 
their entire livelihood by killing animals. But in the two-stage model if 
contractualism forbids it then we do not consider consequentialism, so this 
contradiction never arises.
Type two: Contractualism does not forbid the act, but it has bad consequences. 
This is very common, for example the “regularly eating meat” act in the 
above example. This is precisely why we have consequentialism as a second 
stage, to determine which of several contractually-non-forbidden acts to do.
Roughly speaking, combining the two theories means that if the act is contractually 
forbidden AND/OR has bad consequences (relative to the other available acts), we 
should not do it, removing the problem of contradictions.
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Why is contractualism prioritised first? 
It would make no difference to the outcome of the two-stage theory if the order of the 
two stages was reversed. One could place all the available options in order of opti-
mificity of consequences, then exclude those options which are contractually forbid-
den, and end up with the same results as with the current formation. This is simply 
more labour-intensive.
Objection Two: Demandingness
The argument from demandingness is a common criticism of consequentialism. The 
objection claims that it is too demanding to expect agents to do the most optimific 
act in every situation. The response to this objection has largely already been ad-
dressed in the discussion of scalar consequentialism. When consequentialism is rid 
of deontological categories, we avoid strange situations where the only “permissi-
ble” act is one which seems above and beyond what is intuitively expected of some-
one. Rather, we have a range of available acts on a scale, and, as discussed, the agent 
chooses which to implement. 
Conclusion
The two-stage model fills in many of the gaps in other moral theories. There is no 
attempt to determine which singular act is permitted from a theory which is much 
stronger when only used to determine which acts are forbidden (Scanlonian contrac-
tualism). There is no mistaken use of a continuous axiological value to categorise 
acts into deontic status groups, as in non-scalar consequentialism. There is no jus-
tification of unintuitive acts, as there is in act-consequentialism. Finally, there are 
no problematic contradictions, as there are in Parfit’s non-hierarchical Triple Theo-
ry. Combining the strongest versions of contractualism and consequentialism con-
structs a much stronger model for moral decision-making.
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